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1. Yugoslavia - the state which destroyed itself 
 
I like examples, ladies and gentlemen and I would like to begin my contribution 
with three of them: 
On June 13, 1997, Bosnian Serbs TV station in the report from NATO summit 
that took place in Brussels said, I quote: ”International Crises Group stated that 
NATO did its job in Bosnia perfectly in order to make final Bosnian division” - 
end of the quote. International Crises Group denied that something like was said 
at all. 
The second example is coming from Croatia. The report says that in the last 
week of the pre-election campaign at Presidental elections in Croatia, Croatian 
President, Franjo Tudjman got 4.008 seconds of the state TV air time and his 
opponent 18 seconds!! 
The third one is coming from Montenegro. The state TV newscast broadcast an 
item on the support that came from two local communities to Montenegrin 
President. 24 hours later appeared that two local communities did not send a 
support letter at all and that the report was a falsification!!! 
Please, allow me to give you some general background closely related with the 
topic we are talking about. 
When Josip Broz Tito died in May 1980 the political power of federal 
institutions finally lost a race with the republican political centers. In the 
republics, the communist political leaders organized micro political systems, 
rules, laws - without respect to federal law and the federal government. The 
interests of Republics dominated and the federal government have not been able 
to create a program of common interest. The political pluralism and necessity to 
create a multi-party parliamentary political system appeared first in Slovenia in 
the second half of 80-is and lately in Croatia. On the other hand the communist 
leadership in Serbia and Montenegro was strongly against the multi-party 
parliamentary system. However nobody could stop the changes and they had to 
arrange multi-party elections at the end of 1990.  
It illustrates a contrast between two political, ideologies and strategies as 
follows: 
A) A parliamentary democracy with multi-party elections and a high level of 
Republican independence (Slovenia and Croatia); 
B) A so called parliamentary democracy with no multi-party elections linked 
with strong federal influence (Serbia and Montenegro). Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Macedonia were between those two choices and they sought a common 
solution through compromise. 
 
This political dichotomy has been visible at four district levels: 
A) At the level of the state -- Slovenia and Croatia wanted more independence 
for republican institutions, (those two Republics were also the two most 
developed in the former Yugoslavia), while Serbia and Montenegro preferred 
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the strong federal government. The result of this conflict has been a blockade 
of federal institutions, both parliament and government. 
B) At the level of the Communist party - for a long time in Yugoslav history 
political leaders in the republics have respected the following rule: conflicts 
between republics shall not become a part of public discussion. At the 
beginning of 1989 when the differences about democracy, free elections, the 
role of the Communist Party, the alternative political system, (federation or 
confederation) arose - this rule was broken.  
C) At the media level - controlled by the communist parties in each of four 
republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro) media demonised 
opinions from other republics. In Serbia and Montenegro everything that 
came from Slovenia and Croatia was declared bad. In Croatia everything that 
came from Serbia and Montenegro was declared equally bad. The media war 
started at least ten years before the real war in the former Yugoslavia. Since 
1987 when Mr. Slobodan Milosevic took a power in Serbia, the media war 
within communist party, has been transformed first to the media war between 
Republican communist parties, than between Republics and at the end to the 
pure ethnic media war.  
D) At the level of the Army - Slovenia and Croatia insisted on smaller expenses 
for the Army while Serbia rejected this idea. Under the previous regime the 
Army played a major political role. Adhering for decades to the dogma that 
the defense of socialism and the Communist Party was both the necessary 
condition and the method for defending the state, the JNA (Yugoslav 
People's Army) found itself in an ideological trap as one of the principal 
pillars of the moribund regime. This proved fatal: the JNA became a 
conservative force resisting the process of democratization and the creation 
of pluralist social and political institutions; and when some of the republics 
openly threatened to secede and the breakup of the country became 
imminent, the JNA acted in a grossly unprofessional way. At the end of this 
process the JNA took a one-sided position, the position of the Serbian 
nationalists and chauvinists, the position of Greater Serbia. 
 
According to the researchi in the Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb, (capital 
of Croatia), from June and July 1989, the members of the Yugoslav Communist 
Party became divided on two clear political platforms that were called 
"Serbians" and "Slovenians". Thanks to the media editorial policy that was 
planned and organized in the offices of ruling parties, the political leaders 
succeeded in creating this ideological conflict as a conflict between the ethnic 
groups. Instead of the two political platforms, democracy and non-democracy, 
and the two ideologies, multi-party and one-party political systems people were 
persuading from media and political representatives above all and through the 
Church to make choice between Slovenians and Serbs. Of course there have not 
been choice - people were persuaded and they supported their ethnic political 
leaders. Later on it was choice between Serbs and Croats, then between Serbs 
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and Moslems. This process could easily end as a choice between good and bad 
Serbs, or good or bad Croats, or good or bad Moslems/Bosniacs if you want. 
When you take ethnicity as a dominated criterion in a society the logic 
consequence of that ideology is to create a dictatorship. At the beginning it starts 
with ethnic cleansing continues as a cleansing within the same ethnic group. Just 
a month ago at the session of Republic of Srpska Parliament a deputy accused 
another deputy of being a traitor because he had not christened himself before he 
took the floor. Or another example: The power struggle between the Republika 
Srpska president Biljana Plavsic and Momcilo Krajisnik spilled onto television 
when Plavsic publicly attacked the editorial policy of SRT (Bosnian Serbs TV). 
Plavsic is fighting what she, and international observers feel are Krajisnik's 
attempts to usurp her authority as elected president of the Serbian entity. She has 
found just few allies in the media, as Krajisnik, in addition to his other duties, is 
also head of SRT.  
Coming back to the reasons of the conflict in ex Yugoslavia I want to point out 
that from the beginning of 1988 the communist leaders in the Republics of the 
former Yugoslavia, needed allies in the conflict I was talking above. (Just to 
remind you we are talking again about the conflict within leaders of YU 
communist party.) They were looking for them among the opposition. The 
Communist Party in Serbia found common interests with the chauvinistic 
opposition, right wing movement and the same process happened in Slovenia 
and Croatia. It arose that a republican Communist Party came to have better 
relationship with the anti-communist opposition within the respective Republic, 
than with the Communist Parties from other republics in the former Yugoslavia. 
It was alliance of a communist and anti-communist within a Republic against the 
same alliance from other republic.  
This process of forcing common interests between official Communist parties 
and the chauvinistic opposition in the republics in the rest of Yugoslavia 
exposed a new basis of conflict: "Instead of global conflict between 
governmental Communist Party and society, as happened in East and Central 
Europe, in the former Yugoslavia conflict arose between some elements of the 
Communist Party and some sections of society"!ii  
In the same time an another kind of conflict also arose. The federal government 
led by Prime Minister, Mr. Ante Markovic, adopted in 1990 laws that created 
new rules for the economy, an open market, competition and private investment. 
With such economic reforms republican communist leaders would lose their 
economic power, money and support from public enterprises. The very 
economic reform in the former Yugoslavia had popular support. Prime Minister 
became the most popular politicians at the federal level. His prosperous at the 
federal multi-party elections offered the greatest potential for real change.  
Even at the opposite sides in the Yugoslav conflict, Slovenia and Croatia on one 
side, and Serbia and Montenegro on the other, the political leaders of those 
states had the same interest - to stop economic reform created by the Federal 
Prime Minister. (In Slovenia it was declared as an "anti-Slovene reform", in 
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Croatia as "anti-Croatian reform", in Serbia as "anti-Serbian reform", and in 
Montenegro as "anti-Montenegrin reform"). The former communist leaders who 
were elected at the multi-party elections and who had declared themselves as 
democrats prevented the economic reforms as far as they had prevented it thirty 
years ago. The communist hard-liners did it then in the name of "social justice" 
now in the name of "ethnic interest." The leaders were the same, the reasons 
were the same (to remain in power) and the consequences were the same - the 
disaster of the Yugoslav economy. Thirty years ago the very economic problems 
were changed into ideological peace justified by the Communist Party 
propaganda and in 1990 the very economic problems in the former Yugoslavia 
were changed into the ethnic problems, justified by the same party's propaganda. 
Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, for different reasons of course, refused multi-party 
parliamentary elections at the federal level. At these elections the chauvinistic 
political movement should not have serious chance. The door for increasing of 
ethnic tensions and chauvinistic parties and leaders was definitely opened.  
So, at the federal level in the former Yugoslavia there have not been multi-party 
parliamentary elections. It is, I think, very unusual example in the world's 
politics - to have elections only in the parts of the society not at the common 
level of the same society. 
Referring to their political positions Slovenia and Croatia did not want to wait 
for democratic changes in Serbia and Montenegro and they had decided to 
organize multi party elections at their territory only. 
These two elections in the former Yugoslavia established a dual political 
system: Slovenia and Croatia established a parliamentary democracy and the 
other four republics - Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia - 
represented the old communist political system. 
These two systems could not exist in the common state of course. In the 
Yugoslav situation it meant a potentially higher level of ethnic tensions and 
higher level of de-construction of Yugoslav society. The political leaders were 
expecting conflict and war and they were generating it. 
 
Chauvinism is the last phase of communism in the former Yugoslavia. 
Chauvinism and hatred in the former Yugoslavia have been created by the 
governmental political parties, in Serbia since 1987 - according to the plan of 
creation of Greater Serbia that is prepared by The Serbian Academy for Science, 
and in Croatia since 1990, as a consequence of Serbian chauvinism and idea of 
creation Independent Croatia.  
 
 
2. Religion - who was exploited by whom? 
 
The communist regime in ex YU allowed freedom of expression for religion and 
for believers. About 600 churches or mosques were built in the former 
Yugoslavia after the Second World War. People who were going to church did 
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not openly declare it. It was rather a point of private life. On the other hand none 
wanted to deny it in public. Official opinion was controlled by communists, and 
for people who are believers it usually was also not commendable to make a 
great show of belief. 
The universal ideas of tolerance and humanity, common to all religions, have 
had little airing in the former Yugoslavia. Ethnic conflicts have crystallized 
along the Serb-Moslem, Serb-Croat, Serb-Slovene, Serb-Albanian and Serb-
Macedonian divisions. Within each of these ethnic group religions has played a 
central role in socially integrating the communities. This process has in turn 
helped make sacred the ideal of nationhood. So religion has drawn people 
together into distinct groups. According to research in 1987 the religious 
identification within Moslem, Serb and Croat groups is almost complete. The 
study shows that 82 per cent of Moslems belong to the Islamic faith, 73 per cent 
of Serbs belong to the Serbian Orthodox Church and 89 per cent of Croats 
belong to the Catholic Church. iiiBecause of natural, cultural, historical and to an 
extent linguistic differences, religious identification is high even among those 
who do not practice. According to the same research the level of confessional 
self-identification is four times higher than the level of those who say they are 
believers. Religious identification has also increased as a search for security 
amid growing social tensions. This high level of identification gave a great 
chance for ethnic political parties to manipulate people and believers. 
Nationalist communities have been quick to benefit from religious identification 
and to exploit it to further the cause of national integration. Slogans about the 
religiously based differences among the three communities are preached like 
gospel truth. These maneuvers have culminated in the growing fear of religious 
fundamentalism with each religion fearing the dogmatism of the other two. 
Common slogans proclaim: God and the Croats or God is with Serbs! The 
official Serb propaganda issued a statement that Serbs are a God's chosen 
people! In this way, God usurps the national and folk customs that threaten to 
overwhelm their religion base. Indeed, religion takes on the character of a 
political ideology. Faith or religious affiliation, in turn, becomes proof of 
nationality. In Republic Srpska, what is an entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina is not 
possible to find a job if the applicant is not christened for instance. At the end of 
1991 in one of the Catholic churches in Zagreb the President of Croatia, Mr. 
Franjo Tudjman, attended the process of affiliation of one Moslem family that 
had accepted the Catholic religion. Of course there is a right of any person to 
accept or not to accept any kind of religion. However, when the President of the 
state attends such a ceremony it is regarded more seriously and more 
dangerous.iv Of course both television stations, Serbian and Croats broadcast 
their own stories about this event. Serbian television used it as proof that the 
Croatian regime is the same as the "ustascha" movement in the Second World 
War. Croatian TV pointed out that Moslems accept Christian religion and 
Catholic church. 
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Sarajevo Institute's Research also confirmed that greater partic ipation in 
religious activities in a region, links with a greater tendency towards ethnic 
homogenization. The political institutionalization of religion can thus be a route 
towards totalitarian ideology and the end of free religion. 
However, the religious authorities accepted this kind of influence and everything 
that happened was with their acceptance. "The religion penetrates the national 
and vice versa. The mystique of religion becomes the mystique of the nation."v 
In these cases such is the case in the former Yugoslavia religion was politically 
abused by the politicians. Fr. Marko Orsolic a Catholic Priests from Sarajevo in 
his contribution to the dialogue of Christians, Marxists and others, which was 
held in New York in 1991 writes that "religion and the Church will be politically 
abused as long as the Church does not think that the Bible is an inspiration 
rather than a norm in the political sphere. It is religious book rather than a 
political program. Religion can be abused for political purposes both by 
believers and, playing a perfidious game by various ideologies and political 
bureaucracies."vi 
 
In order to be objective I need to point out that within three dominate religions 
there are lot of differences. Catholic Church in Bosnia for instance played a high 
positive rule during the Bosnian war. They have never been partisan toward 
non-catholic people, they pray for reconciliation and they are truly for the multi-
ethnic life in Bosnia. Catholic Church in Croatia became part of a state effort to 
reach ethnically clean state and Islamic religion in Bosnia became a place and a 
method of Moslem unification. Recently, just a month ago Catholic Church in 
Croatia argued for division between the state and religion holidays. However, 
the Orthodox Church in Serbia became a main supporter of leader indicted as 
war criminals, they were present at all the political session of ruling party in 
Republic Srspka, they supported and they still support politic made by Bosnian 
Serbs leadership. They are against Mr. Milosevic not because he has been 
leading country on the wrong way than because he lost the war. 
Talking about the pre-election time in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1990 I want to 
stress that there was not a rare situation for priests to suggest to their believers a 
day or two before elections, or just at the election-day on how to vote, and 
which voting number it is necessary to choose "if we want to help our people". 
So, voters in the villages voted on the suggestion from their church. (The leader 
of the Serbian Democratic Party told me at the beginning of 1991: "Do you 
know why we lost the elections in Nevesinje?" (It is a small town in 
Herzegovina.) "Because priests of the local church gave to voters the wrong 
number!" In Yugoslavia ballot papers always have numbers and names for all 
political parties.vii  
In the pre-election time all religions were working together, just as ethnic 
political parties. Their main aim was to crush communism and for this aim 
political parties and religions found common interests. One of the consequences 
has been that religions became to be part of the political strategies of ethnic 
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political parties - Catholic church as a part of Croatian efforts - led by the 
Croatian Democratic Community (Croatian political party), and the Orthodox 
church as a part of Serbian efforts led by The Serbian Democratic party, and the 
Islamic community as a part of Muslim efforts led by the Party of Democratic 
Action (Muslim political party). 
The identification between them and political parties had the following 
principles: 
· one people - one goal; 
· one goal - one political party; 
· one political party - one church; 
· one church - one people; 
 
These principles and this strategy produced results at the multi-party elections. It 
was more effective then the political parties expected. It was really a victory of a 
common party and religious strategy.  
However -- who was exploited by whom -- political party by the church or 
church by the political party? 
The identification between religion and political parties often leads to a religious 
state and fanaticism. In societies with different ethnic groups it is particularly 
dangerous especially in the former Yugoslavia. In Croatia the Catholic church 
has accepted all the political aims of their state as their own aims. But 13% of 
the people there were Orthodox, and they could not accept it. The Serbian 
Orthodox church has accepted Greater Serbia as their goal. However, there were 
only 65% Serbs in Serbia. Albanians, Moslems, Hungarians, Croats and other 
minorities could not accept that. These two examples illustrate very clearly: how 
the state and the church exploit this fact of established state-religion as a 
potential cause of conflict.  
At the beginning of April 1992 the Bosnian police arrested two Orthodox priests 
who had arms, bombs and bullets in their church's apartments. It was the first 
public proof that the role of the Orthodox church in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 
former Yugoslavia had not been as peaceful as their declarations. So far no 
public proof about the similar role of other religions has appeared. 
 
 
3. Media - a fiction of reality becomes a "reality of fiction" 
 
When Mr. Slobodan Milosevic came to power in 1987 he moved to take control 
of the state TV station by appointing people from the police and military, and 
journalists from the magazine "Communist" "From that moment on - said 
Mr.Vlado Mares a former editor at Serbian Television - journalism collapsed in 
Serbia."viii 
In September 1993 the soldiers and officer of the Serbian Army in Banjaluka, 
town in Bosnia controlled by Serbian Democratic Party, organized a mutiny 
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against the corruption in Serbian party and government., Serbian television 
broadcast news 40 hours after the mutiny appeared that the mutiny is over. The 
fact is that the mutiny has finished four days later. During he recent opposition 
demonstrations in Belgrade Serbian state TV had broadcast the first news about 
the protest rallies TEN DAYS AFTER THE PROTEST BEGUN. Croatian state 
TV is strongly in favor of current Croatian President. At the elections Tudjman 
got 40 times more time air time than his competitor!! 
I wanted, with these examples, to illustrate that the idea that media in the former 
Yugoslavia share responsibility for the war. They broadcast lie and they do not 
care about the truth. "I have to serve Mr. Milosevic because that is the main 
interest of Serbs!" - stated Director General of Serbian TV to the monitoring 
team of the European Institute for the Media in December 1992. One of the very 
famous TV journalist in Croatia said publicly two years ago: "Of course I have 
to lie if it is an interest of my country!" So called "the patriotic journalism" has a 
leading position in Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian journalism today. As you 
know, ladies and gentlemen, where is too much patriotism there is no 
professionalism. 
The war in the former Yugoslavia started 10 years ago - within the media. There 
have not been any federal Radio or TV stations in my country. There were only 
six republicans TV stations - all of them controlled by the republican communist 
parties. In tandem with increasing political conflict the republican oriented news 
departments, controlled by political leaders - started to produce republican 
oriented, one sided news.  
The political leaders preferred conflict to discussion and compromise, and under 
their influence the news departments started only to broadcast programs in favor 
of the attitudes of republican political leaders. Instead of explaining the conflict 
TV stations started to reinforce the conflict. The conflicts were reproducing. The 
free flow of information has stopped - and closed societies have been created in 
some of the republics. The first step of this strategy has been to establish control 
over media organizations, above all over TV stations. New TV authorities, who 
were appointed by the governmental political parties started to produce 
programs "in the name of ethnic interest". They supported political leaders and 
governmental political parties as organizations who protect ethnic interest. With 
this principle, media organizations stopped to be professional, they started to 
exist only as a part of the state political strategy. Without media, above all 
television, the process of increasing ethnic tensions, conflict and war was not 
possible. Conflict has become a way of governing, and ethnicity the method and 
the most important point of media manipulation. Instead of presentation of this 
conflict as a conflict between democracy and dictatorship media presented it as a 
conflict between ethnic groups.  
This strategy is and was planned, led and organized by the political leaders, 
above all in Serbia. The point is that divisions in the former Yugoslavia started 
from the top of political parties not from the people. (At the end of 1991 I was 
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watching the news in Belgrade with some of my friends. Serbian Television 
reported the two following sentences: 
"HERE ARE DEAD SERBS WHO HAVE BEEN KILLED BY CROATIAN 
FORCES. AN IDENTIFICATION COMMISSION STARTS TO WORK 
TOMORROW!" 
My friend asked me: 
"Can you see what they are doing to us?" 
I asked him: 
"How can a reporter know these victims are Serbs if the identification 
commission starts to work tomorrow?" 
Both of them were surprised. They had not thought of it. Both of them are 
educated, but they are prepared to believe in lies. They cannot see lies and above 
all most of them do not want to see the truth). 
The ethnicity has become a major criteria in editorial policy. Everything is 
allowed in the name of our ethnic interest. The patriotic journalism has become 
a duty of the state controlled media. The following is my favorite example of the 
lies: 
(At the beginning of July 1992 Serbian TV reported about Serbs who were 
killed in town Visoko (Bosnia). Serbian TV reported two following sentences: 
"The "ustascha" forces threw the bodies of Serbs in the Drina river from the 
bridge in Visoko (town in Bosnia). The bodies of Serbs are flowing all the way 
to Ilijas (town in Bosnia)."  
Two points of this report are impossible: 
· First, there is no Drina river in Visoko, only the Bosna river. 
· Second, the Bosna river flows from Ilijas to Visoko, not from Visoko to 
Ilijas. (It is therefore impossible for anything to flow - upstream.) 
Zagreb Radio presenter resigned in February 1992 in protest at the restrictions 
imposed by president Tudjman's Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ). 
"There have never been more bans" - he said - It was easier for me to work 
under the Communists than now!!" Recently internationally awarded Croatian 
weekly Feral Tribune was declared by Croatian officials as an instrument of 
foreign policy. 
One of the best journalist from the former Yugoslavia, Slavenka DRAKULIC 
writes in an article: 
"This is what the war is doing to us - reducing us to one dimension. Before, I 
thought I was defined by my education, my job, my ideas, my character and - 
yes - my nationality too. Now I feel stripped of all of that. I am nobody, because 
I am not an individual any more. I am only one of the 4,5 million Croats". 
The electronic media produce half of the truth, to explain what they want and 
when they want it. Brain washing has started and a brain-washed person starts to 
react in exact accordance with the wishes of the political parties and their 
leaders. They believe only their ethnic TV stations, event though they are 
stations that have lied to them. With the passage of time, they feed on more and 
more lies, and they do not recognize truth. In order to illustrate you the idea I am 
 12
talking about please allow me to quote a Serbian and a Croatian official. The 
former Croatian deputy Information Minister, Mr.Milovan Baletic said: "970 
journalists have come through my office of which I estimate 300 were spies, or 
somehow working for their national intelligence services."ix Mr. Budimir 
Kosutic, at that time Deputy Prime Minister said on television that some of the 
independent media in Serbia work for secret services.x 
This somewhat closed society all the time demands new proof of obedience, 
new victims for "our interest". Chauvinist politicians are exchanged for even 
more chauvinist ones, and obedient people are replaced by more obedient ones. 
The economic and social climate might be getting much worse but the discovery 
of new enemies is testifies to the success of our struggle. The world is against 
Serbs! Croatia will resist to the pressure made by foreign powers. Those two 
sentences are very often quoted in Serbian and Croatian press. Serbian President 
recently said that Serbian development will be twice higher than in the most 
developed country in Europe!!!!. So, a closed society became more closed. 
Director of the Croatian Press Agency HINA, Mr. Milovan Sibl, referring to an 
independent weekly NOVI DANAS (which does not exists today) said: "Many 
of these journalists at the independent magazine NOVI DANAS are of mixed 
origin - one Croat one Serb parent. How can such people provide an objective 
picture of Croatia?"xi 
I would like to stress here a following dilemma that I had at the beginning of the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia. A that time I was Program Director of 
Sarajevo TV as the first elected not appointed person in this position. With few 
examples as follow I hope it will be easier for you to understand the idea of 
media responsibility for the war. Please excuse me if I am taking to much 
personal point of view.  
The viewers in Bosnia could watch in 1990/1991 and 1992 the Croatian TV and 
Serbian TV News. Both of them insisted on the ethnic criteria of the editorial 
policy and both of them broadcast ethnically pure TV news. These TV programs 
have persuaded viewers to take sides in the ethnic conflicts. I had the following 
possibilities: 
a) should I try to create a closed society and to serve politicians as well; 
b) or, should I try to create open society, and give to the viewers a possibility to 
make a choice between different TV news; 
 
The dilemma was: can I win against ethnically pure TV stations using 
multiethnicity as an argument? Can I win against one sided and restricted 
newscast being open to all information and attitudes? Can I win against closed 
society and controlled television using the methods of open society and free 
flow of information. As the program director, and thus the most responsible 
person I decided to take alternative "B". So people could watch each day four 
types of news coverage: Sarajevo TV News, Croatian TV News, Serbian TV 
News and YUTEL TV news - that was the private TV station - which I had 
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decided to broadcast as well. My idea was that viewers will distinguish between 
truth and lie, professionalism and non-professionalism. 
This decision was not welcome: 
A) By Serbian and Croatian TV and their political leaders. They started to attack 
us in their programs; 
B) by politicians in Bosnia who preferred to divide Sarajevo RTV along ethnic 
lines; 
C) By the viewers (From five letters that I have had at the my table four of them 
criticized us from the different ethnic point of view. Only one of them 
supported us, only. So, the viewers have already taken side in the conflict. 
 
All the ethnic political parties offered to various editors an amount of money in 
order to serve their interests. The viewers put pressure also because everybody 
wants to hear her or his version of the truth. Menacing telephone calls, treating 
letters, and all other sort of pressure has been our everyday life. I will give you 
here one of my favorite examples that can illustrate the position of 
professionalism in these days:  
(In October 1991 Serbian TV broadcast a story about an Orthodox priest who 
was beaten by Croatian forces. The same day, Croatian TV broadcast a story 
about a Catholic priest who was beaten by Serbian forces. The point is that both 
stories are true. While Serbian TV did not broadcast the story about the Catholic 
priest, Croatian TV did not broadcast the story about the Orthodox priest. 
Sarajevo TV broadcast both stories. During the first minutes of broadcasting the 
story about the Orthodox priest who was beaten by Croatian forces Croat 
viewers protested and called Sarajevo TV "chethnic" TV! A few minutes later 
when Sarajevo TV broadcast story about the Catholic priest Serbs viewers 
protested and called Sarajevo TV "ustacha" TV.) 
Supported by HDZ the Serbian Democratic Party officially demanded a division 
of Sarajevo TV along ethnic lines. We refused it of course. When I asked the 
leader of Serbian Democratic Party what is the idea of these divisions, and who 
was going to elect journalists for Serbian TV for instance, he answered me: 
"Serbian journalists for Serbian TV will be elected by the Serbian Parliament!!!"  
After the official requirement of the Serbian Democratic Party for division of 
Sarajevo TV station into three ethnic channels, Sarajevo television carried out a 
survey among the population and asked them whether they wanted ethnic 
channels or one service. A total of 330.000 viewers voted against the division of 
the network into separate ethnic channels, and only 35.000 supported it. The 
Serbian Democratic Party said afterwards that the station had no right to ask 
people for their views.  
"We know what they want" - they said. It is exactly the technology of 
dictatorship.  
"We know what they want!" The next step is: 
"We know what our people want!" . Then: 
"I know what our people want!". Then: 
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"I know what my people want!".  
It is technology of dictatorship. 
 
In the meantime all Bosnian institutions have been divided along ethnic lines. 
Only Sarajevo Radio-TV has stayed as a united institution. People finally 
recognized that politicians are leading them to war. In that time, it was at the end 
of 1991 and at the beginning of 1992 from five letters that I had received on my 
table four of them supported us and only one criticize us from the different 
ethnic point of view again.  
I will give you another example. In the middle of April 1992 a dramatic 
situation arose at a dam at Visegrad (town in the East of Bosnia). Some Moslem 
soldiers occupied it, installed explosives and wanted to destroyed the dam. As a 
program director of Sarajevo Television I received two telephones calls: The 
first was from the Moslem political group: 
"Mr. Pejic, if you do not broadcast live our telephone conversation with soldiers 
in the Visegrad dam they are going to destroy it!" 
The second one was from the Serbian political party: 
"Mr. Pejic, if you broadcast in live telephone discussion with the Moslem 
paramilitary group in the Visegrad dam we will shell your transmitters!" 
So, I had two telephones calls in my hands, two political parties, two war sides, 
two threats two seconds for decision and finally two consequences. I decided to 
broadcast this telephone discussion with Moslem soldiers in the dam trying to 
save the dam and prevent ecological catastrophe. A few minutes later Bosnian 
Serbs began with shelling Sarajevo TV transmitter).  
At the beginning of the April 1992 200 citizens decided to start a demonstration 
against all political parties. People were calling for peace and new elections. 
Than I had to make decision: do I want to support it or not. I decided to 
broadcast it live. After several hours in the front of the Republican parliament 
more than 100,000 people were calling for peace and new elections. From other 
Bosnian cities 50,000 people wanted to join the demonstrations but all political 
parties, policy and army did not allow them to come into the city. They were 
sent back. The government than accused me of making a coup. A paramilitary 
group was looking for me in my apartment, then I changed apartment every 
night. Somebody found me and threw a bomb at the balcony of my friend's 
apartment. Then I started to sleep in the TV building. Serbian TV broadcast a 
list of journalist that should be killed and my name was there. I knew what it 
meant: And of course I decided to leave Sarajevo.  
I want to stress that the process of identification between the viewers and their 
ethnic television stations is increasing as ethnic TV produces programs for 
ethnic viewers. Instead of professional journalists, TV programs are prepared by 
ethnic journalists, and viewers watch programs as members of ethnic groups. 
When I described to some of my relatives in Belgrade what is going on in 
Sarajevo they did not believe me. They told me they believe Serbian TV. Even 
they did not believe me that the Serbs are bombarding Sarajevo. Serbian TV for 
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instance did not broadcast who is bombarding Sarajevo. They informed viewers 
that Sarajevo is bombarded but not who are bombarding Sarajevo. After 59 
days, Serbian TV broadcast statement of the Serbian government against 
bombarding of Sarajevo by the Serbian soldiers. It was only two hours before 
session of the United Nations Security Council that declared sanctions against 
Serbia.) 
 
 
4. MEDIA TODAY- servants of current regimes 
 
CROATIA: 
There are very few examples of independent media in Croatia today. The most 
famous ones are weekly Freal Tribune, Radio 101 in Zagreb, daily Novi List in 
Rijeka. There are lot of private weeklies, almost all of them are controlled by 
ruling party members. New weekly TJEDNIK is independent one. Electronic 
media are strongly controlled by ruling party. At the recent pre-election 
campaign in Croatia, the person who is The Head of Croatian TV Controll 
Committee spoke at the ruling party rally. Recently, weekly Feral Tribune was 
charged with 15.000 DEM because of published title in March 1997. 120.000 
Zagreb citizens protested in October 1996 against the attempt to take control 
over local radio stations Radio 101. 
 
SERBIA: 
The most influential media are strongly controlled by the ruling party. At the 
recent local elections opposition won in 13 Serbian cities and took control over 
editorial policy. In some cases we are faced now with professional media policy. 
Unfortunately, in some other cases, such as Studio B in Belgrade, opposition 
behaves at the very same wave as ruling party. Instead of making professional 
control body they appointed members of their parties who became executives of 
opposition parties' politics. There was an idea that one news coverage should be 
edited by one coalition partner and other two by other two coalition partners!!! 
However, there are lot of independent media in Serbia, unfortunately, with very 
small influence such as Radio B 92, weekly Vreme, daily Nasa Borba etc. 
 
BOSNIA: 
Electronic media in Bosnia are divided today along ethnic lines. Both entities 
control its own media and in the part controlled by Bosnian Croats leadership 
the situation is the same. To be objective we need to point out that according to 
all international reports there are lot of independent media in Bosnian 
Federation, the part controlled by Bosniacs. In Western Herzegovina and RS 
situation is much , much worse. So, compared with Republic Srspka and 
Western Hercegovina there is a media paradise at Bosnian territory controlled 
by Bosniacs . Compared to the western standards and criteria the judgment on 
media freedom is different of course. 
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Let me use an example of media coverage in Bosnia. That will, I hope, lead to 
the main conclusion, that media still behave non-professionally. 
 
The event I am going to analyze here is the recent Pope's Visit to Sarajevo: 
 
Bosnian RTV, controlled by Moslems directed all its energies towards preparing 
for the Pope's visit. In the fortnight before his arrival, numerous special 
programs devoted to the coming visit of the Pope appeared during prime-time 
viewing. For the first time in several months, TV BiH reminded viewers that 
there are at least some Croats in the Federation who are not radically opposed to 
the multiethnic state, like BiH Cardinal Vinko Puljic, whose messages of 
reconciliation got extensive coverage. BiH television provided nearly eight 
hours of live coverage. 
 
Few words about RTV Hercegbosna coverage. That is media controlled by 
Bosnian Croats leadership. In the weeks before the Pope's arrival Radio 
Hercegbosna maintained he was coming only to visit Croats. However, as the 
date grew closer their reports from Sarajevo began to include more information 
about the joint preparations of Croats and Bosniaks. In one round table on titled 
"Why the Pope is coming to Sarajevo" (broadcast on April 7, 1997) the words of 
Fra Pero Sudar: "Bosnia should be a mother to all it’s peoples" were given 
prominence. Divisive comments continued to appear, but rarely, as for example, 
on the nightly news broadcast "Kronika" (April 11, 1997) "In Vitez Muslim 
extremists have burned around 50 Croatian homes. This burning should not be 
understood just as a bonfire of hatred; they also wish to light up the road for the 
Pope's coming". It is interesting that Television Hercegbosna, for the first time 
ever, carried a program direct from TV BiH (April 10,1997). It was a special 
program to mark the Pope's visit, in which the highest state and religious 
representatives of Bosniak and Croat communities participated. The fact that 
Pope refused Croat invitations to visit Hercegovina, was not broadcast all.  
 
Few words now about the coverage of media in Republic of Srpska. 
The Pope's arrival in Sarajevo was presented by SRT as a second-class event. 
On the eve of the visit news were occasionally broadcast, which had less to do 
with the visit itself, than with actual or supposed obstacles to it. SRT did not 
regard the Pope's visit as much of a story. In the nightly newscast Novosti (April 
12,1997) reported "in Muslim Sarajevo many explosive devices was found that 
had been prepared for the Pope's reception". This was the first the viewers heard 
of the Pope's arrival. Ten minutes into its broadcast, Novosti ran a brief report, 
without pictures, on the Pope's arrival, announcing that he would meet the next 
day with Serb civil and religious leaders. All emphasis was on the meeting with 
the Serb representatives. The following day, SRT broadcast a three-minute 
report on the meeting of the Pope with the Serb member of the joint presidency, 
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Momcilo Krajisnik. Half of the report consisted of Krajisnik's statement in 
which he described what he had said to the Pope. The pictures accompanying 
the report were strictly focused on the encounter, without a single picture of the 
Pope's other pastoral and state activities. SRT also neglected the Pope's historic 
meeting with the Serbian Orthodox Metropolitan Nikola. Absence of 
information considered politically unpleasant has become characteristic of 
Srpska TV.  
May I ladies and gentlemen remind you to some explanations I had at the very 
beginning of my lecture. If you are not tired, you should remember situation 
before the war in ex Yugoslavia when media backed their republican communist 
leaderships during the political conflict between them. In Bosnia today, and 
examples above witness about that, three leaderships are 100% backed by their 
media as well. The voice of independent media does not exist at all in RS and 
Herceg Bosnia and it is weak in part controlled by Moslems. 
This relationship between professional journalists and ethnic journalists, 
between professional media organizations and governmental political parties in 
fact is struggle between:  
· profession and politics 
· civic and ethnic community 
· freedom and control 
· open and closed society 
· democracy and dictatorship 
 
At the end of my contribution I want to stress following a general point of my 
contribution: If the war in the former Yugoslavia started 10 years ago in media - 
as I mentioned at the beginning it is a true - than if you want to stop the war you 
has to do it in the media first. 
 
 
What does West have to do within the media level? 
1. Five years ago I suggested some of the western participants to make a 
contract with Sarajevo TV Station and improve a better technical facility for two 
Sarajevo TV transmitters. With these two transmitters we could cover almost all 
part of Croatia and the biggest part of Serbia. Viewers in these countries would 
watch at least three different types of news coverage - and they could make a 
choice. I am sure that they would realize that their TV stations are manipulating 
them. Total investment would have been 700 000 USD. My proposal was not 
accepted. Now West has to organize free flow of information and invest hundred 
millions USD.  
 
I want to stress here that West has to change some of their principles. One of the 
principle is that West does not want to help so called state owned or public TV 
stations in East and Central Europe. 
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AS a principle maybe it is O.K. However, let me know, how you can create 
influential private TV stations there: The state is not going to give you 
frequencies, the viewers are poor and they cannot bay satellite dishes, and 
finally even if you have money, even if you have a license, you need years to 
build up transmitters. So, principles are o.k. but in practice they do not work.  
 
2. There are two directions of Western help at the media field: 
a) Try to provide a free flow of information using media out of the former 
Yugoslavia like BBC World Service, Radio Free Europe, Deutche Welle, 
RFI etc.  
b) West has to provide, free of charge, transmitting of Western satellite TV 
channels through the independent televisions in the former Yugoslavia and 
make them more competitive than they are.  
c) It is necessary to provide, free of charge, a TV program (movies, dramas, 
sport events) for the independent TV stations trying to make them more 
competitive of course; 
d) They need video recorders, TV sets, computers, and other kind technical 
equipment.  
 
Media professional there are very lonely. They cannot expect a help from the 
local authorities because they want to control them; they are often under 
pressure from their families and their children, who sometimes point out that 
nobody can live from the principles only; they are under pressure even from the 
listeners, viewers and readers who have been poisoned by politicians and state 
controlled media.  
 
They can expect a help only from West. 
 
Do not leave them alone please. 
 
 
NENAD PEJIC 
Radio Free Europe 
South Slavic Language Service 
Director 
 
 
The former Program director 
of Sarajevo Television 
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